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1I. This Case Presents an Important and
Acknowledged Circuit Conflict
The government candidly acknowledges that 
“the question presented is the subject of disagreement 
in the courts of appeals.” (Br.Opp. 8; see Br.Opp.
13 (“the courts of appeals have taken different ap­
proaches to the question presented”), 16 (noting “the 
disagreement among the courts of appeals”)).1 The 
Court previously has recognized that the question of 
whether an MSPB decision is to be appealed to a dis­
trict court or, alternatively, to the Federal Court is a 
matter of “substantial importance.” Lindahl v. Office 
of Personnel Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 771 (1985).
The government suggests that the importance of 
this circuit conflict may be reduced because although 
the Second and Tenth Circuits have held that district 
courts have jurisdiction to hear mixed cases rejected 
by the MSPB on procedural grounds (like this case), 
those circuits have also ruled that only the Federal 
Circuit can hear a mixed case dismissed by the MSPB 
on jurisdictional grounds. (Br.Opp. 13-14). But dis­
missals by the Board on non-jurisdictional proce­
dural grounds are more common, and it is precisely
1 See Br.Opp. 7 (“The court of appeals noted that the Second 
Circuit had reached a different conclusion in Downey v. Runyon, 
160 F.3d 139 (1998)” ; “The court of appeals rejected [the Second 
Circuit’s] approach”), 8 (“The court’s conclusion ... is consistent 
with the decisions of a majority of courts of appeals to address 
this issue”), 13 (“In Downey ... the Second Circuit disagreed with 
Ballentine [v. MSPB, 738 F.2d 1244 (Fed.Cir. 1984)]”).
2disputes about MSPB procedure that the government 
itself insists ought to be heard only in the Federal 
Circuit.
The government acknowledges that the signifi­
cance of this distinction is far from clear, because 
determining whether an MSPB ruling was procedural 
or jurisdictional can be “difficult and unpredictable.” 
Br.Opp. 15; see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 
130 S.Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (noting that the distinc­
tion between jurisdictional conditions and procedural 
claim-processing rules can be “confusing”). For exam­
ple, if the MSPB concluded that a claimant had failed 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
Board and the Federal Circuit would apparently re­
gard that failure as meaning the Board had no juris­
diction over the claim. See Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 
F.3d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 2001); Hill v. Dep’t o f the 
Air Force, 796 F.2d 1468, 1471 (majority opinion), 
1472-73 (Newman, J. concurring) (Fed. Cir. 1986).
A number of the leading cases regarding federal 
court jurisdiction over mixed claims involved cases 
in which the MSPB had rejected an appeal on pro­
cedural, non-jurisdictional grounds. The Solicitor 
General does not suggest that mixed cases involving 
disputes about the Board’s jurisdiction are common. 
The government correctly recognizes that disputes 
about the timeliness of appeals to the MSPB are not 
jurisdictional. (Br.Opp. 13-14). The deadlines for such 
appeals are established by the MSPB regulations, and 
are claim-processing rules rather than jurisdictional 
limitations. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b). The MSPB has
3no authority to adopt regulations limiting the juris­
diction created by statute. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
Bhd. o f Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S.Ct. 584, 597 (2009) 
(“Congress gave the [National Railroad Adjustment] 
Board no authority to adopt rules of constitutional 
dimension.”); see 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h).
The government notes that the Second Circuit 
in Downey v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 1998), 
held only that district courts could hear mixed 
cases dismissed by the MSPB on non-jurisdictional 
grounds. (Br.Opp. 13). Yet despite exclusion of MSPB 
jurisdictional dismissals from the holding in Downey, 
the United States in Downey filed (and the Solicitor 
General authorized) a petition for rehearing en banc, 
persuasively arguing that the panel’s decision was a 
matter of considerable public importance. (Pet. 22). 
That issue remains as important today as it was 
when the government sought rehearing in Downey.
The United States defends the rule in Ballentine 
on the ground that there is a pressing need for a 
“unified” body of law “concerning matters of MSPB ... 
procedure.” (Br.Opp. 10). If the lower courts failed 
to follow the decision in Ballentine, the government 
warns, there would be “a waste of time and resources” 
as well as “a lack of uniformity” among the district 
courts. (Br.Opp. 10) (quoting Ballentine, 738 F.2d at 
1247). The assertedly mistaken decision in Downey, 
the Solicitor General contends, “could allow employees 
with jurisdictionally deficient CSRA claims to proceed 
to district court by filing an untimely MSPB appeal.” 
(Br.Opp. 15-16). The government’s own arguments
4regarding the merits of the question presented are 
persuasive evidence of its importance.
The circuit conflict poses an administrative prob­
lem for the Federal Circuit, which attempts to pro­
vide guidance to pro se litigants regarding whether 
a challenge to an MSPB decision should be filed in 
that circuit or in a district court. When the MSPB has 
decided a mixed case on grounds other than the 
merits, the correct court in which a pro se litigant 
should proceed currently depends on the governing 
law of the circuit where the litigant works or worked. 
The Federal Circuit’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners 
and Appellants” contains the following explanation:
This court does not have jurisdiction to re­
view cases involving bona fide claims of dis­
crimination ... that were raised before and 
considered by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board. If your case involves such claims and 
you are unwilling to abandon them forever, 
you must proceed in a district court (which 
will hear all your claims, both discrimination 
and nondiscrimination) or before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (which 
will hear your discrimination claims only).
You may waive your discrimination claims on 
the ... form sent to you by the clerk. If you 
fail to complete and return the form within
14 days after the date of docketing, the clerk
will dismiss your petition.2
A litigant in a case such as this would reasonably 
conclude from this explanation that he or she should 
sue in district court, which is the right answer in two 
circuits, the wrong answer in five circuits, and an 
answer of unknown correctness in five other circuits.
The Federal Circuit’s mandatory Form 10,3 
entitled “Statement Concerning Discrimination,” 
requires litigants to check one of several statements, 
the first two of which are “[n]o claim of discrimination 
... has been or will be made in this case” and “[a]ny 
claim of discrimination ... has been abandoned and 
will not be raised or continued in this or any other 
court.” The form also offers the option of checking 
“[t]he petition seeks review only of the Board’s dis­
missal of the case for lack of jurisdiction or for un­
timeliness,” but with no specific explanation of how 
that alternative relates to the others. The Federal 
Circuit’s Guide and Form 10 illustrate the intractable 
practical problems created by Ballentine and the 
conflict of which it is a part. See Otiji v. Hey man, 47 
F.Supp.2d 6, 6 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing discrimina­
tion action because plaintiff had signed Form 10).
2 http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/ 
pro%20se.pdf (visited December 26, 2011). The quoted material 
is at p. 167 (emphasis in original).
3 http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/ 
forms/form 10.pdf (visited December 26, 2011).
6II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is 
Incorrect
The government’s proffered justifications for the 
decision of the Eighth Circuit illustrate the unsound­
ness of that decision and of the opinion in Ballentine 
on which it was based.
The class of discrimination claims that can be 
filed in federal court is delineated in section 7703(b)(2). 
The government argues that a case is covered by 
section 7703(b)(2) only if the MSPB has decided the 
merits of the discrimination claim:
[T]he judicially reviewable action by the 
MSPB which makes an appeal a “case of dis­
crimination” under § 7703(b)(2) that can be 
filed in district court is that the MSPB has 
decided “both the issue of discrimination and 
the appealable action[.]”
(Br.Opp. 9) (quoting Ballentine, 738 F.2d at 1246 
(quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(a)(1) and 7703(b)(2))). But 
section 7703(b)(2) does not define the cases to be filed 
in district court by reference to the section 7702(a)(1) 
requirement that the Board in mixed cases must de­
cide within 120 days “both the issue of discrimination 
and the appealable action.” Rather, section 7703(b)(2) 
provides that actions are to be filed in district court if 
they are “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the 
provisions of section 7702.” (Emphasis added). A case 
is “subject to” the various requirements of section 
7702 so long as it both involves otherwise appealable 
adverse actions (§ 7702(a)(1)(A)) and “alleges that a
basis of the action was discrimination prohibited by 
[certain listed statutes].” (5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1)(B) 
(emphasis added)). A mixed case containing such 
allegations is “subject to” section 7702 regardless of 
how the MSPB resolves it. The provision of section 
7702(a)(1) directing the Board to “decide both the 
issue of discrimination and the appealable action” 
does not delineate the cases “subject to ... section 
7702.” Rather, that clause sets out one of the statuto­
ry directives applicable to the cases that are delineat­
ed in sections 7702(a)(1)(A) and 7702(a)(1)(B) and 
that thus are “subject to” the various commands of 
section 7702.
“There is nothing in any of [the relevant] sections 
of the CSRA that suggests th at... a matter becomes a 
‘case of discrimination’ under subsection (b)(2) of sec­
tion 7703 only after a merits decision.” Downey, 160 
F.3d at 145 (emphasis added). It would make no sense 
to say that a claim is a “case[] of discrimination 
subject to the provisions of section 7702” only if (and 
thus after) the MSPB has decided it on the merits. 
The very purpose of section 7702(a) is to regulate 
how and when the Board is to address an appeal that 
“alleg[es] ” discrimination.
The government also relies on section 
7702(a)(3)(A):
[An] employee may ... seek review of 
“[a]ny decision of the Board under [Section 
7702(a)(1)]” -  that is, the decision on “both
8the issue of discrimination and the appeal- 
able action,” 5 U.S.C. 7702(a)(1) -  in federal 
district court. 5 U.S.C. 7703(a)(3)(A)[sic].4
(Br.Opp. 9). But section 7702(a)(3) does not delineate 
which cases are to be heard in district court; rather, 
section 7702(a)(3) designates the point in time when a 
Board decision is reviewable, and contains no provi­
sion regarding which court is to review the Board’s 
action. Section 7702(a)(3) clearly does not mean that 
a decision of the Board in a mixed case is only judi­
cially reviewable if it resolved on the merits both the 
issue of discrimination and the appealable action; 
were that the case it would bar review by any court, 
including the Federal Circuit, of an MSPB decision 
rejecting an appeal on purely procedural grounds. To 
the contrary, section 7702(a)(3) controls the time at 
which judicial review is authorized for “[a]ny decision 
of the Board,” and applies equally to MSPB decisions 
in mixed cases that are reviewable by any court. As 
the government has repeatedly pointed out, most 
recently in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011), “the word ‘any’ 
has an ‘expansive meaning.’ ” (Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, p. 11 
(quoting Republic o f Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S.Ct. 2183,
4 The government’s brief inadvertently refers to section 
7703(a)(3)(A) rather than section 7702(a)(3)(A). There is no such 
subsection in section 7703.
92189 (2009) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 520 
U.S. 1, 7 (1997)))).
Moreover, if as the government contends an 
MSPB decision that failed to resolve the merits of a 
discrimination claim were not a “judicially reviewable 
action” under section 7702(a)(3), then section 7702(e) 
would authorize a civil action in district court.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
if at any time after -
* * *
(b) the 120th day following the filing of 
an appeal with the Board under sub­
section (a)(1) of this section, there is no 
judicially reviewable action 
* * * 
an employee shall be entitled to file a civil 
action to the same extent and in the same 
manner as provided in section 717(c) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... [or] section 15(c) 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967.
The interpretation of sections 7702 and 7703 
advanced by the government in the instant case is 
contrary to the position the government took in 
Ballentine. In that case the MSPB had dismissed the 
petitioner’s claim on the ground that it was pre­
mature. The government argued that a challenge to 
the Board’s action should be heard in a district court, 
not in the Federal Circuit:
10
This case is governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702 
and 7703 which provide that when issues of 
racial discrimination and reprisal are raised 
in an action appealable to the Board (a 
“mixed case”), a petition for judicial review ... 
may be filed in an appropriate district 
court.... [A] decision of the Board in a mixed 
case may be heard only in an appropriate 
district court.... [E]ven a question of the 
Board’s jurisdiction to hear an attempted 
mixed case appeal must be addressed by a 
district court.... [T]he Board’s interpretation 
of [the regulation] regarding the time for 
filing a petition for appeal with the Board in 
a mixed case should be addressed by a dis­
trict court, as this regulation was promul­
gated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7702.
(Motion to Transfer to District Court, Ballentine v. 
Merit Systems Protection Bd., No. 84-907 (Fed. Cir.), 
pp. 1-2) (footnote omitted). The government’s original 
position on this issue was the correct one.
III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle for 
Deciding the Question Presented
This case presents an ideal vehicle for resolving 
the circuit conflict. The decision of the court of ap­
peals below was based solely on its view that federal 
district courts lack jurisdiction over a mixed case 
following an MSPB decision if the MSPB has not 
determined the merits of the discrimination claim. 
The MSPB decision in this case was not based on any 
asserted lack of jurisdiction. Thus had this case been
11
filed in any district court in the Second or Tenth Cir­
cuits, there would, under Downey or Harms v. Inter­
nal Revenue Service, 321 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2003), 
have been jurisdiction over petitioner’s age, gender 
and retaliation claims. There are no disputed issues of 
fact relevant to existence of federal jurisdiction.
The government argues that, even if this Court 
were to grant review and hold that the district court 
has jurisdiction in this case, the United States on 
remand would ultimately prevail on other grounds. 
The brief in opposition predicts5 that, were this case 
returned to the lower courts for further proceed­
ings, those courts would eventually conclude that the
5 The government’s prediction that it would prevail on 
exhaustion is wrong. This defense is based principally on Harms 
v. Internal Revenue Service, 321 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2003), a 
case that is distinguishable from the instant case. Harms 
concerned a claimant who could have refiled his MSPB appeal in 
August, 1997, but had failed to do so until November of that 
year. The district court dismissed his claim for failure to exhaust 
because Harms had not presented “any evidence to justify his 
delay.” 321 F.3d at 1010.
The instant case is distinguishable from Harms on at least 
two grounds. First, in January 2007, when the administrative 
law judge’s filing deadline expired, Kloeckner was still in the 
process of pursuing discovery before the EEOC. There was not 
yet an agency decision from which any appeal could have been 
taken. Second, on October 23, 2007, the agency issued a new 
Final Decision rejecting Kloeckner’s claim. Kloeckner filed a 
timely appeal within 30 days of that October 2007 decision. 
Regardless of whether plaintiff in the fall of 2007 had a right to 
reopen her earlier MSPB appeal regarding the agency’s 2006 
decision, the applicable regulations clearly permitted a new 
appeal from the later 2007 agency decision.
12
complaint should be dismissed because Kloeckner 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The United 
States thus reasons that “review of the question pre­
sented would not alter the outcome of this case.” 
(Br.Opp. 17).
This contention is not an appropriate basis for 
denying review. The lower courts in the instant case 
never addressed the government’s exhaustion argu­
ment. The government’s brief in the Eighth Circuit 
did not even raise this issue.6 It is often true that 
where a case has been dismissed on one ground, other 
issues remain on which the defendant might subse­
quently prevail. Because federal courts at least ordi­
narily are obligated to address jurisdictional matters 
before considering any other issue, it will usually be 
the case that an appeal regarding the existence of 
federal jurisdiction will occur in a case in which the 
defendant has other, unaddressed defenses. That has 
not been regarded as a reason to deny review. See 
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1206 (2011) 
(reversing jurisdictional dismissal and remanding for 
consideration of whether appellate deadline was 
subject to equitable tolling).
-------------- ♦--------------
6 Brief for Appellee, No. 10-2048 (8th Cir.), pp. 12-26.
13
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
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